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ENGLISH FUNDING OF THE
SCOTTISH ARMIES IN ENGLAND
AND IRELAND, 1640–1648*
LAURA A. M. S TEWART
Birkbeck College, University of London
A B S T R ACT. The rebellion against Charles I’s authority that began in Edinburgh in 1637 involved the
Scots in successive invasions of England and armed intervention in Ireland. Historians have almost uni-
versally taken a negative view of Scottish involvement in these wars, because it has been assumed that the
Scottish political leadership sacriﬁced all other considerations in order to pursue an unrealistic religious
crusade. This article suggests that aspects of the Anglo-Scottish relationship need to be reappraised. Using
estimates of English payments to the Scots during the 1640s, it will be argued that the Scottish leadership
made pragmatic political decisions based on a practical appreciation of the country’s military and ﬁscal
capacity. Substantial payouts from the English parliament enabled the Scottish parliamentary regime to
engage in military and diplomatic activities that the country could not otherwise have aﬀorded. The 1643
treaty that brought the Scots into the English Civil War on the side of parliament contrasts favourably with
the 1647 Engagement in support of the king. It will be shown that, although the English parliament did not
honour all of its obligations to the Scots, it does not automatically follow that the alliance was a failure in
ﬁnancial terms.
‘The English were for a civill League, we for a religious Covenant. ’1 Robert
Baillie’s oft-quoted description of the treaty agreed between the English and
Scottish parliamentary regimes in the autumn of 1643 has inﬂuenced assess-
ments of the Anglo-Scottish relationship in this period ever since. It has been the
foundation of a familiar portrayal of the Scots as a monolithic group of naive
religious enthusiasts, made ‘arrogant ’ by the extraordinary military and diplo-
matic successes of the years 1639 to 1641.2 Historians of the Civil War period have
carried out penetrating analyses of the Scottish presence in England during the
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1 Letters and journals of Robert Baillie, ed. D. Laing (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1841), II, p. 90.
2 D. Stevenson, Revolution and counter-revolution, 1644–1651 (Edinburgh, new edn, 2003), p. xvi (quo-
tation) ; L. Kaplan, Politics and religion during the English Revolution: the Scots and the Long Parliament,
1643–1645 (New York, NY, 1976), pp. xviii–xx.
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mid-1640s, but the perspective remains predominantly hostile : by their narrow
commitment to religious uniformity, unrealistic expectations of their own military
capability, and limited understanding of the workings of English parliamentary
politics, the Scots rendered themselves vulnerable to manipulation by more
sophisticated political operators.3 Historians of Scotland have been no less con-
demnatory. In a general work on seventeenth-century Scotland, Rosalind
Mitchison argued that the Anglo-Scottish alliance was founded on incompatible
religious aims and promoted by men who had given no thought to how Scotland’s
armies could be supported.4 Although David Stevenson recognized that the
Scots could not passively sit back and wait on events in Ireland and England, his
interpretive framework rested on the belief that, from January 1644, it was
‘downhill all the way’ for the Scottish parliamentary regime.5 John Scally has
recently endorsed Stevenson’s position. In his account, the regime’s ‘pan-British
plans ’ became ‘wildly unrealistic ’ and ‘outrageous’ as the prospect of a nego-
tiated settlement drifted ever further from view.6
A more optimistic interpretation of the Anglo-Scottish relationship has re-
cently been put forward by Allan Macinnes. His study of ‘ the British revolution ’
suggested that Scottish military and political action ought not to be judged solely
on its repercussions for factional alignments at Westminster. By focusing on
English parliamentary activity, historians have tended to caricature the Scots as
political inge´nues, whose religious ideology made themmore concerned with ends
than means. Macinnes, by contrast, has asserted that the idealism and ideological
consistency displayed by the Scottish political leadership was always ‘ tempered by
political pragmatism’.7 These are valid points, albeit ones that require a fuller
investigation than Macinnes’s study allowed, but have they proved strong enough
to make historians rethink the Anglo-Scottish relationship? Or has Macinnes
advocated the academic equivalent of moving deckchairs on the Titanic?
3 The role of the Scots in English parliamentary politics is explored in J. S. A. Adamson, ‘The
triumph of oligarchy: the management of war and the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 1644–1645’, in
C. Kyle and J. Peacey, eds., Parliament at work : parliamentary committees, political power, and public access in
early modern England (Woodbridge, 2002), pp. 101–27; J. Peacey, ‘The exploitation of captured royal
correspondence and Anglo-Scottish relations in the British Civil Wars, 1645–1646’, Scottish Historical
Review (SHR), 79 (2000), pp. 213–32; D. Scott, Politics and war in the three Stuart kingdoms, 1637–1649
(Basingstoke, 2004), chs. 3–4. Evidence that ‘English dislike of the Scots remained extremely strong’ in
this period is not hard to ﬁnd. M. Stoyle, Soldiers and strangers : an ethnic history of the English Civil War (Yale,
CT, 2005), p. 73. Stoyle’s elegant argument perhaps does not adequately consider the complexity of
individual attitudes towards the Scots. See S. Barber, ‘The people of northern England and attitudes
towards the Scots, 1639–1651: ‘‘The lamb and the dragon cannot be reconciled’ ’’, Northern History,
35 (1999), pp. 96, 102, 105, 113.
4 R. Mitchison, Lordship to patronage : Scotland, 1603–1745 (Edinburgh, 1983), pp. 54, 62.
5 Stevenson, Revolution and counter-revolution, pp. xvi, 177–8.
6 J. Scally, ‘The rise and fall of the covenanter parliaments, 1639–1651’, in K. M. Brown and
A. J. Mann, eds., The history of the Scottish parliament, II : Parliament and politics in Scotland, 1567–1707
(Edinburgh, 2005), p. 139.
7 A. I. Macinnes, British revolution, 1629–1660 (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 157–8; Kaplan, Politics and
religion, pp. 14, 108.
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The view that the Scottish ship of state was sinking, and sinking fast, from 1644
onwards has been conﬁrmed by Ian Gentles. His recent study of ‘ the English
revolution’ focused primarily on the ﬁscal and military transformation of the
English state necessitated by the parliamentary challenge to Charles I, which
would eventually enable Oliver Cromwell to conquer almost the entire archi-
pelago. Gentles does not, by any means, construct a neo-Whig teleology, where
the New Model triumph becomes an inevitability. He does conclude that the
Scots were simply unable to compete with superior English resources, even on
home ground. ‘Heroic exertions ’ could not ultimately prevent ‘ﬁnancial and
logistical weakness ’ from ‘fatally ’ undermining the very existence of the Scottish
parliamentary regime.8
These conclusions rested primarily on Gentles’s reading of the only published
work on Scottish government ﬁnance then available. An article written by David
Stevenson in 1972 showed that although the Scottish parliamentary regime had
undertaken signiﬁcant reforms to an out-dated ﬁscal system, it remained too
fragile to support simultaneous military interventions in Ireland and England.
Scotland’s ﬁscal weakness meant that the country’s political leadership became
dependent on the English parliamentarians honouring treaties that oﬀered
ﬁnancial support for Scottish military intervention in Ireland and England.
Stevenson concluded that the Scots displayed their ‘gullibility ’ by believing
‘repeated though often vague English promises to pay them’. This view was
reinforced by Stevenson’s later study of the Scottish army in Ulster, which re-
vealed that the English parliament had already shown itself to be an unreliable
paymaster before negotiations to send a force into England were seriously under
consideration.9 Peter Edwards has recently summed up the prevailing consensus
on Scottish participation in the Civil Wars : over-conﬁdence had ‘seduced’ the
Scots into believing that they could lead a militant Protestant crusade across the
entire archipelago. By 1645, the Scots were militarily over-extended and their
political agenda had become ‘untenable ’.10
This article aims to provide estimates of the value of English ﬁnancial con-
tributions to the Scottish government between 1641 and 1648. It does not attempt
to estimate the total cost of raising and supplying Scotland’s armies. Historians of
this period clearly owe much to Stevenson’s pioneering study, but the complexity
of the records11 and the limited capabilities of the computing tools available
8 I. Gentles, The English revolution and the wars of the three kingdoms, 1638–1652 (Harlow, 2007), p. 127.
9 D. Stevenson, ‘The ﬁnancing of the cause of the Covenants, 1638–1651’, SHR, 51 (1972),
pp. 89–123. The gist of this article is summarized in M. Bennett, The Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland,
1638–1651 (Oxford, 1997), pp. 193–7. D. Stevenson, Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates : Scottish–Irish
relations in the mid-seventeenth century (Belfast, 1981), p. 139.
10 P. Edwards, ‘Arming and equipping the covenanting armies, 1638–1651’, in S. Murdoch and
A. Mackillop, eds., Fighting for identity : Scottish military experience, c.1550–1900 (Leiden, 2002), p. 264.
11 Scotland’s parliamentary record is available in a cumbersome printed form: Acts of the Parliaments
of Scotland, ed. T. Thomson and C. Innes (12 vols., Edinburgh 1814–75). The Scottish Parliament
Project, St Andrews University, has recently completed a searchable online version of these records,
The records of the parliaments of Scotland to 1707 (RPS), ed. K. M. Brown et al. (St Andrews, 2007). Its editors
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to historians in the 1970s prevented Stevenson from fully appreciating the value of
English ﬁnancial contributions to the Scottish regime. Awareness of the ﬁnancial
signiﬁcance of the English alliance suggests that the Scottish decision to enter
the English Civil War in 1643 was based on a pragmatic assessment of Scotland’s
military, ﬁscal, and diplomatic position. Although the English parliament cer-
tainly failed to prioritize the needs of the Scottish army in Ulster, this article will
show that it continued to provide valuable ﬁnancial support. It will therefore
be suggested here that the funds provided through the English alliance enabled
the Scots to pursue a British agenda that could not otherwise have been aﬀorded.
Only by engaging in the wider archipelagic arena, so it was believed, could
Scotland’s political and religious autonomy be secured within the British multiple
monarchy.
The parliamentary alliance did not, ultimately, deliver what the Scots desired.
However, the skill with which the Scottish leadership negotiated their army’s
exit from England in 1647 has not been considered. These men had a ﬁrm
grasp of fundamental political, military, and ﬁnancial realities, which ensured
that the Scots were able to return home largely on their own terms and with
their army intact. Suﬃcient English funds were forthcoming to allow the Scots
to avoid the type of crisis that threatened the English parliament in the summer
of 1647, when it tried to disband an army still awaiting payment of its arrears.
This article therefore questions the view that the Scots were locked into a down-
ward spiral towards disaster by the mid-1640s and establishes that Macinnes’s
more constructive view of Scottish diplomacy in this period needs, at the very
least, fuller investigation. The pragmatism of the regime’s leadership had
averted disaster in the mid-1640s ; the unrealistic proposals of the king’s Scottish
friends in 1647 seriously imperilled the survival of the Scottish parliamentary
regime.
I
The Scottish rebellion against Charles I was a colossal gamble for a country
lacking any credible ﬁscal-military capability in 1638. Important recent studies,
especially by Edward Furgol, have shown how the Scottish parliamentary regime
was able to utilize an expatriate community of Scottish merchants and soldiers to
build a relatively modern, disciplined ﬁghting force before the summer of 1639.12
decided, as Thomson and Innes had done a century earlier, that the papers of the committee of estates
(Scotland’s government from c. 1638 to 1651) were not, strictly speaking, parliamentary records and so
they remain in manuscript. See D. Stevenson, The government of Scotland under the covenanters, 1637–1651
(Edinburgh, 1982) for a useful guide. The main series for government papers in this period is National
Archives of Scotland (NAS), PA11.
12 E. M. Furgol, ‘Scotland turned Sweden: The Scottish covenanters and the military revolution,
1638–1651’, in John Morrill, ed., The Scottish National Covenant in its British context (Edinburgh, 1990),
p. 134; E. M. Furgol, ‘The Civil Wars in Scotland’, in J. Kenyon and J. Ohlymeyer, eds., The Civil
Wars : a military history of England, Scotland and Ireland, 1638–1660 (Oxford, 1998), pp. 41–72; E. M. Furgol,
A regimental history of the covenanting armies, 1639–1651 (Edinburgh, 1990), introduction. See also
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Less attention has been given to how Scotland’s armies were ﬁnanced. Scottish
royal revenues, although rising in the 1620s and 1630s, were clearly inadequate
for the task. From the outset, the new regime was forced by necessity to ﬁnd
innovative ways of tapping into the nation’s wealth. Initially, as Stevenson has
shown, the regime proceeded cautiously. There was no attempt to collect the
king’s traditional revenues until mid-1640,13 so the Bishops’ Wars of 1639 and
1640 had to be funded from other sources. Much of the monies handled by
central government before 1641 had been borrowed, given as voluntary donations,
or coined from loans and gifts of silver plate. It is also possible that revenues from
two new taxes ordered in 1640, known as the ‘ tenth penny’ and the ‘ twentieth
penny’, had begun to come in.14
In August 1640, the Scottish army invaded the north of England. By the end
of the month, a Scottish army was camped on English soil and had occupied
Newcastle, which was the source of most of the coal that would keep Londoners
warm in the approaching winter months. Negotiation of a cessation of arms
began at Ripon in October 1640, during which time the Scots insisted that their
army should be supported at England’s expense. While the army remained in
England – the treaty of London was not agreed until August 1641 – £85015 a day
would be required. More detailed demands followed on 12 January 1641, when
the Scots submitted an account for losses and expenses incurred prior to the
cessation of October 1640. This account shows that the Scots were using their
advantageous military position to make ﬁnancial gains over and above the re-
muneration of their soldiers. In the ﬁrst part of the account, the Scots demanded
compensation for the cost of an expedition to the north of Scotland, for Scottish
ships impounded by the English, for the price of ammunition bought in from
abroad, and for domestic fortiﬁcations. These sums amounted to £514,129.
A second section then set out what were, according to Stevenson, several ‘ rather
vague items’, which the Scots stated they were willing to pay themselves. It seems
plausible that the Scots never expected to be paid anything from the second
section. These sums were probably included to show English parliamentarians
that the Scots could have claimed more, and to discourage them from trying
P. Edwards, Dealing in death : the arms trade and the British Civil Wars (Stroud, 2000), pp. 80–6, 99–102,
106–7, 118–20, 124–5, 181–4; S. Murdoch, ‘Scotland, Scandinavia and the Bishops’ Wars, 1638–1640’,
in A. I. Macinnes and J. H. Ohlmeyer, The Stuart kingdoms in the seventeenth century : awkward neighbours
(Dublin, 2002), pp. 113–34; S. Murdoch, Britain, Denmark–Norway and the house of Stuart, 1603–1660 (East
Linton, 2000).
13 D. Stevenson, ‘The king’s Scottish revenues and the covenanters, 1625–1651’, Historical Journal,
17 (1974), p. 27.
14 Government accounts for the regime’s early years are incomplete. Some of the key sources were
compiled at a later date and are summaries, not detailed accounts. Thus, it is often diﬃcult to know
exactly when money came into the government’s hands. NAS, PA15/1, PA16/3/5/3-4, E101/5;
D. Stevenson, ‘The covenanters and the Scottish mint, 1639–1641’, British Numismatic Journal, 41 (1972),
pp. 95–104; Stevenson, ‘The ﬁnancing of the cause’, pp. 90–1.
15 All sums are in £ sterling unless otherwise stated. £12 Scots was worth £1 sterling.
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to haggle the Scots down from the £514,129 detailed in the ﬁrst part of the
account.16
When a peace treaty was ﬁnally concluded in June 1641, a so-called ‘brotherly
assistance ’, worth £300,000, was agreed to cover costs predating October 1640.
This was clearly much less than the Scots had asked for. It is also well known that
the English parliament paid only half of this sum. Yet Stevenson’s research has
revealed that the Scots actually received much more than the brotherly assistance
alone, because the army’s pay from October 1640 onwards was met by the
English parliament.17 A letter from the Scottish commissioners in London, read to
the Scottish parliament on 10 August 1641, stated that ‘ the whole arriers due to
oure army [in England] … are receaved and goes from hence this day towards
Newcastle by carts ’.18 According to the great committee at Westminster, nego-
tiations over the value of the brotherly assistance had been impeded by the need
to pay Scottish soldiers, since ‘ the daily charge of the armies does exhaust all the
monies they can possibly get ’.19
The brotherly assistance was never intended as payment for the Scottish force
occupying the north of England, but as compensation exacted by a victorious
army for the costs it had incurred defending the country from hostile invaders
(albeit led by the monarch). A summary of the burdens of the kingdom up to
the autumn of 1643 appears to show that the Scottish army was paid £266,050
(£3,192,600 Scots). This sum roughly accords with the cost of supplying the
Scottish army for ten months at £850 a day. A further £150,000 (£1.8million
Scots) was paid on top of this as a brotherly assistance.20 In total, the Scottish
regime had received just short of £416,050 (nearly £5million Scots) as a result of
the military campaigns of 1639 and 1640.
By focusing exclusively on the brotherly assistance, historians have overlooked
the fact that the English parliament had already met its major ﬁnancial com-
mitment to the Scottish army. Having paid oﬀ its soldiers, the Scottish regime was
now free to use the brotherly assistance for what was probably always its intended
purpose : the partial satisfaction of impatient creditors. As a consequence, the
coﬀers of Scotland’s richest and most well-connected ﬁnanciers remained open
to the regime. Payouts favoured Sir Thomas Cunningham, factor at the Dutch
staple of Veere, who was under great pressure from Dutch creditors to repay
them, and the premier Scottish politician, Archibald Campbell, marquis of
16 The second part of the two almost identical copies of this account held in the NLS carries an
error: the total sum that the Scots were willing to forgo was recorded in both accounts as £271,500, but
when the individual items are added up, the total comes to only £221,500. National Library of
Scotland (NLS), Adv.Ms.33/4/6, treaties at Newcastle and London, 1640–1, fos. 109r–110v; NLS,
Wod.Fol.LXXIII, fos. 50v–51v; C. S. Terry, The life and campaigns of Alexander Leslie, ﬁrst earl of Leven
(London, 1899), pp. 147, 152 ; Stevenson, ‘The ﬁnancing of the cause’, p. 95. See also David Stevenson,
The Scottish revolution, 1637–1644: the triumph of the Covenanters (Newton Abbot, 1973), pp. 205–13, 217.
17 Stevenson, ‘The ﬁnancing of the cause’, p. 95.
18 NAS, PA6/7, Appendix, 10 Aug. 1641, fos. 1r–1v. See RPS, A1641/7/39.
19 NAS, Letter, 28 July 1641, PA6/3, fos. 1r–1v. See RPS, A1641/7/17.
20 NAS, PA16/3/5/3, pp. 3, 4.
578 L A U R A A. M. S T EW A R T
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 04 Nov 2010 IP address: 193.61.7.38
Argyll. Unnamed lenders resident in the capital, Edinburgh, the regime’s lead-
ing ﬁnancial oﬃcer, Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, and the commander of the
Scottish forces, Alexander Leslie, earl of Leven, also beneﬁted.21 C. S. Terry’s
assessment, that the deal was ‘not disadvantageous to Scotland’,22 would have
been shared by a regime that was now in a much stronger position than its leaders
could possibly have hoped for in the autumn of 1638.
I I
The outbreak of Civil War in England during the summer of 1642 presented the
Scots with both a threat and an opportunity. By the treaty of London, the Scottish
parliamentary regime had secured the domestic religious and constitutional
concessions that its leadership had been ﬁghting for, but this would be imperilled
if Charles defeated his parliamentarian antagonists and, in a strengthened
position, turned his attention back to Scotland. The dominant grouping in the
Scottish parliament, led by Argyll, was able to convince most of the political
nation that self-preservation demanded intervention in England. Meanwhile, in
England, a group of parliamentarians around John Pym were facing up to the
unpalatable possibility of an imminent royal victory. Interminable rivalries and
political diﬀerences had blocked the potential for creating a uniﬁed English
ﬁghting force, directed by men with coherent objectives. In order to leapfrog
these obstacles, Pym’s grouping began wooing the ostensibly neutral Scots.
Accordingly, the Solemn League and Covenant was agreed by the two parlia-
mentary regimes in the autumn of 1643.23 Oﬃcially, the reasons given for a
second Scottish invasion of England were the need to combat popery, secure
close religious ‘conjunction’ between the kingdoms, preserve the liberties of the
two parliaments, and establish a lasting peace throughout Charles’s dominions.24
Anxious Scottish parliamentarians may also have been persuaded by the regime’s
proven track record in achieving its objectives.
The basic provisions of the Anglo-Scottish treaty of 1643 gave the English
parliament 21,000 men in return for £30,000 monthly, subsequently raised to
£31,000 when the Scots took control of the vital garrison at Berwick in September
1643 : itself an important concession, since it protected the army’s rear and safe-
guarded the path back over the border.25 Admittedly, the 1643 treaty had obliged
the Scots to pay for the levying of their army prior to entering England. The Scots
21 NAS, PA14/1, fos. 6v, 7v, 11r–12v, 28v, 29r, 30v, 35r, 110r, 125r. Cunningham explained the
importance of satisfying key Dutch creditors in a letter to the committee at Goldsmiths’ Hall, The
National Archives (TNA), SP46/106, fo. 97. 22 Terry, Life, p. 152.
23 J. R. Young, The Scottish parliament, 1639–1661: a political and constitutional analysis (Edinburgh, 1996),
pp. 56–63; A. Woolrych, Britain in revolution, 1625–1660 (Oxford, 2002), pp. 256–67.
24 NAS, PA11/1, fos. 36v–39r.
25 Stevenson, Scottish revolution, p. 287; A collection of the state papers of John Thurloe, ed. T. Birch (7 vols.,
London, 1742), I, pp. 30–1; Papers relating to the army of the Covenant, 1643–1647, ed. C. S. Terry (2 vols.,
Edinburgh, 1917), I, p. lxxv.
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also claimed that £31,000 would not pay all the army’s costs, although the English
parliament did agree to settle any outstanding arrears once peace was secured.
Since the Scots thought that their army would be decisive in bringing Charles
back to the negotiating table, this was a condition that the Scots believed the
English parliament could be held to. Although all of the brotherly assistance had
not been forthcoming in 1642, the Scots had acquired suﬃcient funds from the
English parliament to pay their army and provide some relief for their major
creditors. Moreover, should the parliament prove dilatory in meeting their
commitments, it would not be Scottish communities bearing the burden of un-
paid soldiers roving about their ﬁelds and gardens. The League was a good deal
for the Scots. It was based on a pragmatic awareness that Scotland could not
simply ignore events in other parts of the Stuart dominions and a practical ap-
preciation of the country’s ﬁscal weaknesses. As far as the Scots were concerned,
it was the English parliament, not the Scottish regime, which would be expected
to foot most of the bill for Scottish military action in England.
The question is whether the Scots did ‘ foot most of the bill themselves ’.26 From
accounts produced primarily by Hepburn of Humbie,27 it can be estimated that
the Scottish army received approximately £616,089 (£7,393,068 Scots) while
it was active on English soil between January 1644 and the end of 1646. These
sums were provided mainly from assessments levied on an increasing number
of English counties, with some funds coming from customs and excise duties.
Top-ups from Goldsmiths’ Hall in London were also occasionally provided.28
The problem was that these sums came in very slowly.29 As relations between the
two allies deteriorated, an increasingly powerful faction within the English par-
liament sought to divert funds away from what it regarded as a mercenary force,
in order to remodel the English army. As a result, Scottish troops were even more
likely to supplement their income by helping themselves to the property of their
English hosts. This inevitably increased resentment towards them and, as the
Scottish commissioners in London realized, played into the hands of enemies who
wished to convince parliament to dispense with Scottish assistance.30
26 Gentles, English revolution, p. 207. See also Scott, Politics and war, p. 80.
27 Humbie’s accounts were published by Army of the Covenant, ed. Terry. The ﬁgures produced here
were compiled from the original manuscripts. This revealed that one of the accounts, now catalogued
as NAS, PA15/7, had parts missing, although the survival of the last page meant that the ﬁnal totals
were unaﬀected. NAS, PA15/7, 7a, 8. For other army accounts, not included in Terry’s edition, see
NAS, PA15/5, 6, 9.
28 NAS, PA15/7a, pp. 1–4; NAS, 1645–6, PA15/8, pp. 2–3, 124–5, 138, 162.
29 By August 1644, the Scottish commissioners were observing that the Scottish forces were not
receiving timely payment by the English. See Correspondence of the Scots commissioners in London, 1644–1646,
ed. H. W. Meikle (Edinburgh, 1917), p. 35.
30 The controversy over Scottish behaviour in the north of England and its manipulation by in-
terested parties at Westminster has been comprehensively analysed. See D. Scott, ‘The ‘‘Northern
Gentlemen’’, the parliamentary Independents, and Anglo-Scottish relations in the Long Parliament’,
Historical Journal, 42 (1999), pp. 347–75, and D. Scott, ‘The Barwis Aﬀair : political allegiance and the
Scots during the British Civil Wars’, English Historical Review, 115 (2000), pp. 843–63. Ronan Bennett
has pointed out that, having sustained two royalist forces and a Scottish army by 1640, the northern
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The presence of the king in the Scottish camp from 5 May 1646 deepened
tensions between the allies but did not, ultimately, bring a ﬁnal peace settlement
any closer. Two weeks later, the House of Commons voted to get rid of their, by
now, unwelcome guests. Initially, the Scots were oﬀered £50,000 on handing over
their garrisons in the north of England, with a further £50,000 once the army was
back over the border.31 Although fearful that English troops would be used to
evict them by force and aware, from July, that the House of Commons was no
longer prepared to fund their army,32 the Scots held out for better terms. In the
negotiations that followed, both sides agreed that the Scots should have been paid
£992,000 for the entertainment of their army and the garrison of Berwick before
18 September 1646. The allies disagreed on three main points : the amount of
money and provisions the Scottish army had received with the English govern-
ment’s consent, the extent of the sums lifted by the Scots without parliament’s
consent, and whether the Scots were entitled, under the terms of the 1643 treaty,
to make any further claims.
The papers presented to the House of Commons (summarized in Appendix 1)
show very diﬀerent estimates for the sums received by the Scottish army in
England. According to the Scots, their army had received £684,000 in money,
provisions, and free quarter. When subtracted from the £992,000 that both sides
agreed the Scots should have been paid, this left an outstanding sum of £308,000.
Other expenses cited by the Scots amounted to £937,415. The Scottish account
therefore suggested that the English ought to pay them a further £1,245,415.
Unspeciﬁed ‘great losses ’ were to be remitted to ‘ the Consideration of the
Honourable Houses ’. The English argued that the Scottish army had received
£607,769 in money and provisions, and had taken £855,000 in free quarter and
in assessments levied ‘without consent ’ : a total of £1,462,768. This sum exceeded
the amount that both sides had agreed the English parliament should pay the
Scottish army. Scottish demands for further recompense under the terms of the
August 1643 treaty were refuted.33
Is it possible for historians to judge the veracity of these respective claims?34
Using calculations based on the surviving accounts of the Scottish government
counties would have complained about the presence of any army in 1644, although the fact it was a
Scottish force certainly exacerbated tensions. R. Bennett, ‘War and disorder: policing the soldiery in
Civil War Yorkshire’, in M. C. Fissel, ed., War and government in Britain, 1598–1650 (Manchester, 1991),
pp. 254–6. See also Macinnes, British revolution, p. 159. James Graham, marquis of Montrose was also
harrying the north-west border in early 1644 with a small force that may have contained Scots.
E. J. Cowan, Montrose : for Covenant and king (Edinburgh, 1995), pp. 145–51.
31 The diary of Bulstrode Whitelocke 1605–1675, ed. R. Spalding (Oxford, 1990), p. 206; Scots com-
missioners, ed. Meikle, pp. 183–4.
32 Terry, Life, p. 412; Scots commissioners, ed. Meikle, pp. xxix, 184, 189.
33 Journal of the House of Commons (CJ), IV, pp. 653–6.
34 G. F. T. Jones’s analysis was undermined by the author’s mistaken assumption that the terms of
the 1643 treaty had not survived. Stevenson spotted this error, but dismissed the article without
presenting an alternative analysis of the account. Jones’s error led him to critique the Scottish estimates
from the wrong angle, but his conclusions were based on a good understanding of how the accounts
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does not, unfortunately, provide a silver bullet. The accounts compiled by
Hepburn of Humbie show that the Scots in fact received £616,089 from the
English. No attempt appears to have been made to calculate the value of free
quarter, as the papers presented to the House of Commons conceded (an estimate
was provided instead). This sum is nowhere near the £464,063 which the Scots
publicly claimed to have received from England in money and provisions.
Although the Scottish commissioners could truthfully say that the accounts were
incomplete in August 1646,35 it is likely that they intentionally presented a con-
servative estimate of what had been obtained. Of more signiﬁcance were the
claims made under article ﬁve of the 1643 treaty, which allowed the Scots to seek
‘ further satisfaction of their breithrein of Ingland’ over and above the monthly
allowance granted to the army.36 The English rejected these ‘several other Sums’
with the argument that the army’s costs had not, in fact, exceeded the £992,000
allowed to them. This must have been a highly contentious point ; although
the Scottish regiments quickly fell below full strength, it had been conceded at
the outset that the monthly allowance was insuﬃcient for the army’s needs. The
English also demanded a ‘particular Account ’ of the sums incurred in levying
the Scottish army, for which the Scots legitimately sought recompense. If the
Scots felt they had been short-changed over article ﬁve, losses there may have
been made up elsewhere. If the Scots had been obliged to accept that they
were only entitled to £992,000, and that they had actually received £1,462,769,
then the English could have claimed that the Scots owed them £470,768.37
During the last months of 1646, an agreement was reached. It obliged the
English parliament to pay the Scottish army £200,000 before it crossed the
border, with the promise of another £200,000 thereafter.38 Why was this sum
settled on? If the English were willing to forego the £855,000 that they claimed
the Scots had taken without consent, this left £384,231 still owing to the Scots out
of the £992,000 already agreed upon. If the Scots were willing to take the
£308,000 still owed to them from the £992,000, and abandon all other claims
except the £87,415 in levy money, this would require the English to pay them
£395,415.39 Looking at the ﬁnal settlement in these terms reﬂects concessions on
both sides : the Scots had relinquished their claims under article ﬁve, while the
English had decided not to press their point about the value of free quarter.
The ﬁgures presented to the House of Commons need to be understood as
had been compiled. G. F. T. Jones, ‘The payment of arrears to the army of the Covenant’, English
Historical Review, 73 (1958), pp. 459–65; Stevenson, ‘The ﬁnancing of the cause’, p. 110.
35 One account was not closed until October, NAS, PA15/8, p. 159. 36 RPS, 1643/6/86.
37 CJ, IV, pp. 653–56; Stevenson, Scottish revolution, p. 287; Thurloe, ed. Birch, I, p. 50. Kaplan’s claim
that the Scottish army numbered over 30,000 men by mid-1644 was refuted by Furgol, who suggested
that numbers had dropped not risen. Kaplan, Politics and religion, p. 74; Furgol, Regimental history, p. 6.
Robert Baillie implies that there were less than 14,000 foot in England by mid-1645, Letters and journals,
ed. Laing, I, p. 292.
38 The details of the agreement can be found in Whitelocke, ed. Spalding, p. 229. See also Army of the
Covenant, ed. Terry, p. lxxvii.
39 A similar conclusion was reached by Jones, ‘Payment of arrears ’, p. 465.
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bargaining counters, rather than as an accurate breakdown of the cost of the
Scottish army. Analysis of the Scottish government’s accounts means we now
know that the English estimate of what they had paid to their ally was broadly
accurate. This is not surprising. The English negotiating strategy was focused on
blocking Scottish claims made under article ﬁve of the treaty and on stressing the
value of free quarter. Scottish demands under article ﬁve were perhaps not
expected to be successful, but these items did provide the Scots with something
they could aﬀord to sacriﬁce.
In the end, only the ﬁrst instalment of £200,000 passed into Scottish hands and
the second remained unpaid.40 The total sum received by the Scottish army
in England between January 1643 and February 1647 therefore amounted to
approximately £816,089 (£9,793,068 Scots). It was less than the value of the
monthly allowance, but probably more than the Scots ought to have been granted
if free quarter had been fully accounted for. By this reckoning, the English did
meet a substantial part of their obligations to the Scottish army in England.
Crucially, the ﬁnal pay-oﬀ ensured an orderly disbandment once the army
returned home in February 1647.41 Naturally Charles I thought himself sold at
‘ too cheap a rate ’,42 but the decision to abandon a king who had nothing to oﬀer
them and return to Scotland without rupturing the parliamentary alliance was
the only credible option available at that time.
Thus far, we have been concerned with the payment of English money to
Scottish forces active in England. In the wake of the Irish uprising of October
1641, the Scots oﬀered to send troops to Ireland and a treaty was agreed in July
1642. These forces were sometimes referred to as the ‘New Scots ’, to distinguish
them from the resident Scottish settlers who had taken an enthusiastic part in
James VI and I’s plantation schemes. As a result of the 1642 treaty, 11,371 troops
were levied at Scottish expense and sent to Ulster, on condition that the English
parliament paid them thereafter.43 By the time these troops arrived, England
was also sliding into Civil War. On 4 March 1643, leading Scottish politicians
(convening as the privy council) conceded that the ‘unhappie diﬀerences and
distractions ’ in England had prohibited payment of the Scottish forces in Ireland
and that alternative funds would have to be found.44 A campaign to raise a
voluntary loan for Ireland was launched in Scotland in the spring of 1643 and
secured £14,427 (£173,129 Scots). The Scottish regime’s accounts suggest that
40 F. Peck, Desiderata Curiosa, or a collection of divers scarce and curious pieces relating chieﬂy to English history
(2 vols., London, 1779), II, pp. 370–1. There are two receipts, each for £100,000, dated 21 Jan. and
3 Feb. 1647. 41 Stevenson, Scottish revolution, p. 68.
42 Stevenson, Revolution and counter-revolution, p. 66, quoting D. Dalrymple, Lord Hailes, ed.,Memorials
and letters relating to the history of Britain in the reign of Charles the First (Glasgow, 1766), pp. 190–1.
43 The treaty had stated that 10,000 men would be sent, Furgol, Regimental history, p. 5 ; Stevenson,
Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates, pp. 315–16.
44 Register of the Privy Council of Scotland (RPCS ), 2nd ser., ed. P. Hume Brown et al. (8 vols.,
Edinburgh, 1899–1908), VII, pp. 407–8; H. Hazlett, ‘The ﬁnancing of the British armies in Ireland,
1641–1649’, Irish Historical Studies, 1 (1938–9), p. 39. Errors in this study have been exposed by
Stevenson, Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates, p. 141, n. 116, p. 144, n. 125.
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approximately £163,833 Scots was raised through taxation and explicitly paid to
the army in Ireland. These sums were only a small fraction of the army’s arrears,
calculated to be £146,650 (£1,759,800 Scots) in early 1643. By the end of the year,
arrears may have risen to £312,000 (£3,744,000 Scots).45 By the following spring,
a despairing marquis of Argyll admitted that ‘no probable way’ existed for sup-
plying the Ulster army and a proposal to dispatch some of these troops for service
in England was put forward, although ultimately rejected.46 With the Scottish
army now active in England, it was no doubt believed that success there would
pressurize the English into supporting the army in Ireland.
The Scottish army in Ulster did not receive anywhere near the sums of money
it was expecting from its English paymasters. However, one aspect of the ﬁnancial
relationship between the two parliamentary allies, hitherto overlooked, suggests
that the English government did not simply abandon its obligations to the Scots.
Records of the committee for Scots aﬀairs, sitting at Goldsmiths’ Hall in London,
show that its treasurers redeemed bills of exchange given to merchants contracted
by the Scottish government to supply its forces in Ireland. The committee appears
to have repaid loans worth around £121,000 (£1,452,000 Scots).47 Not all loans
provided for the army in Ireland were repaid ; it is likely that the Edinburgh
merchant, Sir John Smith, was unable to redeem the bills of exchange that had
secured his loan of £11,555 (£138,660 Scots), while Sir Thomas Cunningham was
almost certainly left with a debt of over £5,000 (£60,000 Scots) owing to creditors
in Holland.48 The reliance on private individuals to supply the Irish army prob-
ably cost both governments more than if their ﬁnancial systems had been eﬃcient
enough to pay soldiers directly. The merchants who sent oatmeal to Ireland in
February 1644 charged 17 merks per boll – £11 6s 8d Scots – when the Fife county
ﬁars had struck the price of a boll of oats for that year at £5 Scots.49 Although the
Scottish government had successfully used the English alliance to secure credit it
might otherwise have been denied, it is nonetheless apparent that raising loans in
this way was neither an eﬃcient means of supplying the army in Ireland nor
adequate for its purposes.
From around the autumn of 1645, many members of the English parliament
began to regard the New Scots as an impediment to English interests in Ireland.
With the Scottish army removed from England and unable to exert pressure
there from early 1647, the House of Commons was able formally to give up all
45 RPCS, 2nd ser., VIII, pp. 83–92, cited in Stevenson, ‘The ﬁnancing of the cause’, p. 98;
Stevenson, Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates, 140; NAS, PA16/3/2/5, PA15/7, pp. 21, 30, 37.
46 Stevenson, Scottish revolution, pp. 245–6, 265–6, 286–7; NAS, PA11/2, fos. 18v, 19r, 28r.
47 Estimate based on TNA, SP46/106, fos. 90–126. No systematic attempt has been made here to
collate references to loans that may not have been repaid.
48 NAS, PA11/1, fos. 110v–111r; TNA, SP46/106, fo. 97. Cunningham’s debts were causing concern
amongst the Scottish commissioners in London by at least the spring of 1645, Scots commissioners,
ed. Meikle, p. 65.
49 RPCS, 2nd ser., VIII, pp. 90–1; A. J. S. Gibson and T. C. Smout, Prices, food and wages in Scotland,
1550–1780 (Cambridge, 1995), p. 177.
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responsibility for Scottish forces in Ulster.50 This statement of intent had not, as
yet, been conﬁrmed by the House of Lords, which allowed the Scottish govern-
ment to continue petitioning the English parliament for satisfaction, but by
October, the committee of estates had seemingly accepted that it would have to
take ﬁnancial responsibility for its Ulster forces. It was agreed that a further six
weeks of a tax known as the monthly maintenance would be levied in Scotland to
provide forces still active in Ireland with some ‘small releife ’.51 Disbandment of
these troops had been considered in 1644, but the proposal was welcomed neither
by the men themselves, who were holding out for the payment of their arrears,
nor by the shires of the south-west of Scotland, where returning troops would
make landfall, nor by some members of the Scottish regime, who feared that
unpaid troops would refuse to return home peaceably. The presence of dis-
gruntled soldiers in the south-west in 1644 and in 1647 did contribute to tensions
in that region.52
Chronic under-resourcing of the army in Ireland had profound consequences
for the government and people of Scotland. Although the Ulster forces were by no
means ineﬀective, Monro’s campaigns were persistently hampered by inadequate
supplies and by the eﬀects of this situation on relations between Monro, his
commanding oﬃcers, and their men. Raymond Gillespie has suggested that the
New Scots prioritized grievances relating to supply and pay ahead of ﬁnding
common cause with the Old Scots or British settlers. Divisions were further
exacerbated when Monro’s forces were denied Irish land in lieu of money for
arrears. Ruthless acquisitioning of supplies inevitably made the New Scots deeply
unpopular wherever they went, limiting the extent to which local communities
and their leaders were willing to assist them.53 Meanwhile, the failure of the
British forces to destroy Irish military capability directly threatened Scotland:
James Graham, marquis of Montrose, and Alasdair MacColla recruited from
amongst armed and battle-hardened Irishmen, who were only too happy for the
opportunity to raid Campbell lands in western Scotland. The scourge of Irish and
Highland warriors (combined with plague) devastated the country, interrupted
trade, disrupted government activity, and brought the business of collecting taxes
to a near standstill. Fears that the regime itself was under threat distracted the
Scottish army from its task in England and diminished its eﬀectiveness there.
50 CJ, v, pp. 113–14, discussed in Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 68–9.
51 NAS, PA11/5, 1 Apr. 1647, 10 May 1647, 8 June 1647, 27 Sept. 1647, 29 Oct. 1647.
52 Some members of the regime appear to have been concerned that the troops from Ireland would,
if disbanded, diminish the number of experienced men available to ﬁght in other parts of the British
Isles. Stevenson, Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates, pp. 152–6. The war committee of Ayr made an
oﬀer of supplies for the army in Ireland contingent on it remaining there, NLS, Adv.Ms.33/4/8,
pp. 63–4.
53 R. Gillespie, ‘An army sent from God: Scots at war in Ireland, 1642–1649’, in N. Macdougall,
ed., Scotland and war AD79-1918 (Edinburgh, 1991), pp. 122, 125; W. S. Brockington, ‘Robert Monro:
professional soldier, military historian and Scotsman’, in S. Murdoch, ed., Scotland and the thirty years’
war, 1618–1648 (Leiden, 2001), pp. 222–3; Bennett, Civil Wars, pp. 198–9; Stevenson, Scottish covenanters
and Irish confederates, pp. 160, 203.
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Not all of the problems experienced by the army in Ireland were caused by
inadequate supply and the Scots were arguably not much more badly treated
than the native British forces that had also declared for parliament after 1642.
However, inadequate supply exacerbated other political tensions, undermined
the eﬀectiveness of Monro’s forces, and exposed them to those accusations of
incompetence which were also being levelled at the army in England.54
I I I
English money was responsible for greatly increasing the revenues available to the
Scottish parliamentary regime: in total, £1,232,139, or £14,785,668 Scots, was
paid directly by the English parliament. At least another £121,000, or £1,452,000
Scots, was paid by the English to merchants supplying the Scottish army in
Ireland. In an English context, this does not appear to be a large sum of money.
The City of London alone paid nearly half this sum in direct parliamentary
taxes between 1642 and 1650.55 In a Scottish context, however, these sums were
very signiﬁcant. During the same period, the Scottish regime accounted for
approximately £4,318,720 Scots – £359,853 sterling – in taxation revenues (see
Appendix 2). These ﬁgures show why the parliamentary alliance was so vitally
important for the Scottish regime. English funds almost certainly prevented
Scottish forces disintegrating through lack of resources. They also provided se-
curity for loans and enabled some of the regime’s debts to be repaid.
Until the mid-1640s, the British agenda pursued by the Scots was enabled by
the provision of English funds, which gave the Scottish government greater re-
sources than Scotland could ever have supplied. From the Scottish perspective,
the entry of their army into the English Civil War could not have been conducted
on better terms. There are parallels with the policies adopted by another small
state, Sweden, which Scotsmen may have been familiar with: during the 1640s,
Sweden occupied foreign territory in order to pay for expensive wars too burden-
some for the homeland to sustain.56 Such a strategy was clearly high-risk.
The Scottish political agenda in 1644 depended on a swift and decisive military
campaign bringing Charles back to the negotiating table. When this did not
happen, the presence of a large and expensive Scottish army on English soil
increasingly came to be seen as yet another point of tension between the allies.
Had the Scots been paying their army, they would have had more control over
its movements and, in theory, could have withdrawn it from England at any time.
In practice, political rather more than ﬁnancial imperatives kept the army in
54 For overviews of Scottish activity in Ireland, see M. Perceval-Maxwell, ‘ Ireland and Scotland,
1638 to 1648’, in Morrill, ed., Scottish National Covenant ; Stevenson, Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates ;
J. Ohlmeyer, ‘The Civil Wars in Ireland’, in Kenyon and Ohlmeyer, eds., The Civil Wars.
55 B. Coates, The impact of the English Civil War on the economy of London, 1642–1650 (Aldershot, 2004),
p. 23.
56 J. Glete, War and the state in early modern Europe : Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as ﬁscal-military
states, 1500–1660 (London and New York, NY, 2002), pp. 174, 187.
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England, at least until the second half of 1646. Only once it became clear that the
presence of the army in England was threatening to rupture the parliamentary
alliance, without bringing a settlement with the king any closer, did the Scottish
leadership ﬁnally decide that they had to leave. During the last months of 1646,
Scottish diplomacy was aimed at securing suﬃcient funds to ensure a peaceful
and orderly exit from England. This was successfully achieved.
While the Scottish regime had some success in pressurizing the English
parliament into paying its army in England, it was incapable of doing likewise
for its forces in Ireland. This had repercussions for English policy objectives there.
As Nicholas Canny has pointed out, Monro’s ‘ﬁrst priority ’ was the defence
and recovery of Irish lands belonging to fellow-Scots, not the advancement of
the English parliamentarian war eﬀort against Irish royalists. Some English
parliamentarians were surely being somewhat unrealistic if they expected Monro
to behave otherwise, given that the most consistent support he had received came
from Scotland.57 Such supplies as Monro was able to extract from the English and
Scottish regimes, and from the Irish population, maintained a Scottish armed
presence in Ireland for six and a half years. The New Scots undoubtedly helped
to safeguard the long-term survival of Ulster’s Protestant settlers, both Scots and
English. Yet at the time of their dispersal by the New Model Army in September
1648, there was little to show for the eﬀorts of forces that, compared to other
Scottish regiments, had displayed rather unusual levels of independent-minded
tenacity.58
One of Monro’s other key priorities was to ensure that Ireland could not
be used as a springboard for a royalist invasion of Scotland. That objective was
largely achieved; the Scottish parliamentary regime was not toppled by an Irish
invasion. Even Montrose’s brief period of dominance was always likely to be
ephemeral, as long as the regime could recall from England relatively disciplined
and experienced troops determined to defend their covenanted homeland.59
However, the failure to close down the threat posed to domestic security by Irish
forces had imperilled the regime’s existence and undermined Scottish military
eﬀectiveness in England. When the Scottish regime found itself under attack in
the spring of 1644, its failure to destroy MacColla’s forces may have caused some
members to panic and demand the return of the army in England. A full-scale
withdrawal was certainly under serious discussion in September 1645. A twelve-
point paper, presumably penned by the commissioners in London, made a
pragmatic case against withdrawal. It listed the inconveniences of bringing such
a large army back into Scotland and highlighted the possibility that English
royalists would overrun the counties vacated by the Scots, thereby moving the
57 N. Canny, Making Ireland British, 1580–1650 (Oxford, 2003), p. 562. Sir John Hotham asserted
that if England paid the Scots, England would control them, Stevenson, Scottish covenanters and Irish
confederates, p. 49.
58 This paragraph is informed by Stevenson, Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates, ch. 7.
59 Stevenson recognized the scale of the crisis facing the regime but did not overestimate Montrose’s
strengths. Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 29–35.
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war towards the Scottish border. Point six was particularly important : the com-
missioners added that ‘our diﬃculties wilbe greater in obtaining the arreares due
to our armies ’ should they leave England prematurely.60 Having committed to
intervention in England, the Scottish political leadership did not intend to dis-
credit themselves by giving up and going home empty-handed.
The decision to maintain a Scottish military presence in England in 1646
did not, ultimately, bring the Scots very much closer to achieving their objectives.
It did buy the Scottish regime suﬃcient time to engineer its disengagement
from the English arena on acceptable terms. This was of critical importance to
the marquis of Argyll’s political survival. His decision to stabilize his domestic
powerbase,61 at the expense of the wider British agenda, must be regarded as the
pragmatic option. Royalists and moderates who wished to use Scottish forces
to assist the king could not now use the excuse that the army must remain on
foot until it could be paid.62 Departure from England, followed by an orderly
disbandment, gave the regime space to begin putting its house in order : taxation
revenues appear to have risen in 1647, while the excise, ﬁrst levied at the begin-
ning of 1644, ﬁnally began to make some contribution to the regime’s coﬀers.63
Yet the withdrawal from England had left Argyll with no clear proposals either
for addressing the state’s enormous ﬁnancial liabilities or for inﬂuencing any
potential settlement in England. These twin imperatives would make it increas-
ingly diﬃcult for Argyll to argue that the alliance with the English parliament
had anything left to oﬀer the Scots.
It has been asserted recently that ‘ the Covenanters ’ biggest mistake had been
to depend on the promises of English ﬁnancial support’.64 Does the evidence
presented here suggest that such an assessment is correct? Scottish military ac-
tivity in England and Ireland was certainly predicated on the provision of English
money, not all of which was forthcoming. Even if some of the problems experi-
enced by the Scottish regime after 1644 could have been anticipated in 1643, the
potential disadvantages were still outweighed, at that time, by the perceived
advantages. The conclusion of the treaty of London had suggested to the Scots
that, even if the English parliament could not be wholly trusted to honour its
commitments, a Scottish army was capable of exerting suﬃcient pressure to gain
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial and political concessions. The failure of the English parlia-
ment to meet its commitments to the Scots in Ireland had already been exposed,
but this provided another reason to enter the conﬂict in England. The best way
for Scottish politicians to secure remuneration for their forces in Ireland was to
ensure that they were the ones to broker a settlement between Charles and his
English parliament. There was no doubt that the Scottish parliamentary regime
60 Scots commissioners, ed. Meikle, pp. 118–19. 61 Scott, Politics and war, p. 124.
62 Stevenson, Revolution and counter-revolution, p. 68.
63 These issues will be discussed more fully in a forthcoming article.
64 Gentles, English revolution, p. 110. This assessment is almost identical to the one put forward in an
earlier article by Edwards, ‘Arming and equipping the covenanting armies, 1638–1651’, p. 264.
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was taking a gamble in 1643, but at that point its army was the largest and the
most experienced in the British Isles. The regime had good grounds for believ-
ing that the successes of 1641 could be repeated, perhaps even improved on,
especially now that English parliamentarians were able openly to support their
Scottish allies.
Scottish military involvement in the English Civil Wars is, for many cogent
reasons, often regarded as a failure.65 Yet, as Macinnes has observed,66 this
assessment must be tempered by consideration of the alternatives available at
the time. The Solemn League and Covenant had oﬀered the Scottish regime a
unique opportunity to reconﬁgure the British multiple monarchy on terms that
would secure both its own existence and Scottish political autonomy. It had
included a commitment from the English parliament to pay Scottish forces for
the duration of their campaigns and given the Scottish political leadership the
practical means to achieve their ends. To a degree hitherto under-appreciated
by historians, the English parliament did attempt to meet its obligations to the
Scots. Civil war and plague in Scotland, more than the direct costs of ﬁnancing
the armies in England and Ireland, had imperilled the Scottish government’s
ﬁscal stability.
A comparison can be made between the 1643 treaty and the 1647 Engagement
agreed between the king and three leading Scottish moderates, including the duke
of Hamilton. In 1643, negotiations were conducted with an English parliament
that possessed the mechanisms to pay the Scottish army. In 1647, Hamilton was
relying on the good word of an untrustworthy king, who was in captivity and
incapable of giving practical assistance to the Scots. Compared to the clear terms
set out in the 1643 treaty, the Engagement’s promises to pay the remainder of
the brotherly assistance, the arrears of the army in Ireland, and the ‘charge and
expense’ of their army were vague.67 The 1643 treaty was negotiated from a
position of strength; the Engagement of 1647, by contrast, was a desperate
gamble. It demanded that a Scottish army risk what Argyll had worked so hard to
avoid a year earlier : facing the English New Model Army in the ﬁeld. As Argyll
appears to have realized, Scotland was not capable of invading England in 1648.
It did not possess the funds, or even the realistic possibility that funds might soon
become available. Oliver Cromwell’s forces had the home advantage and were
better supplied than the Engagement army. Back in Scotland, the political elite
were, by this time, deeply divided – partly as a result of the pursuit of Argyll’s
British policies – and the regime lacked the political unity required for such an
enterprise. The New Model Army’s victory at Preston was neither a foregone
conclusion, nor did it lead inexorably to victories at Dunbar, Inverkeithing,
and Worcester. Yet Preston did mark a turning point ; militarily, because of the
psychological impact of being beaten by an English army, and politically, because
65 For example, Scott, Politics and war, pp. 82–5, 101–2.
66 Macinnes, British revolution, pp. 157–8.
67 Scottish historical documents, ed. G. Donaldson (2nd edn, Glasgow, 1974), p. 217.
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the narrowly based radical faction that returned to power in September 1648,
with Cromwell’s assistance, could not convincingly claim to be the representative
of the political nation.68 In 1643, securing English money had been a credible,
albeit risky, strategy for Scotland’s political leadership. The pursuit of an ag-
gressive military strategy four years later, without such ﬁnancial support, should
be regarded as the more serious and decisive error.
Appendix 1 Summary of the accounts presented to the House
of Commons, August 1646
The Scottish account to the nearest £ sterling
Received in monies and provisions 464,063
Received as free quarter 219,937
Owed from the charges of their army at £31,000 monthly
992,000x(464,063+219,937)
308,000
Owed for levying their forces 87,415
Owed under ﬁve other headings 850,000
Total received by the Scots 684,000
Total owing to the Scots 1,245,415
The English account to the nearest £ sterling
Received by the Scots in monies and provisions
(including proﬁts from coal)
607,769
Received by the Scots in free quarter and assessments
levied without consent of the English parliament
855,000
Total received by the Scots 1,462,769
If the Scots are entitled to £992,000, the Scots owe
the English
470,769
Source : Adapted from: CJ, IV, pp. 653–56; available online at <www.british-history.
ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=23767>.
68 ‘Radical faction’ has been used deliberately to replace the outdated notion of a ‘kirk party’. See
Alan Macinnes, ‘The Scottish constitution, 1638–1651: the rise and fall of oligarchic centralism’, in
Morrill, ed., Scottish National Covenant, p. 107.
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Appendix 2 Sources used to calculate Scottish taxation revenues
and payments from England
It is not within the remit of this article to provide a full analysis of Scottish govern-
ment revenues, but some explanation of the sources used is needed. Scottish
government accounts from the 1640s are diﬃcult to interpret. In the main, the
regime maintained the king’s Exchequer (National Archives of Scotland (NAS),
E series) as a separate institution and employed its own treasurers to deal with
particular revenue streams (with some exceptions, NAS, PA series). Treasurers
were expected to keep accounts to show what monies they were liable for and
what monies they had spent. Thus, a treasurer would enter into the charge side of
the account the entire value of the sums he was expected to collect, then enter into
the discharge side of the account all the money that had not been collected or
accounted for. Using the raw totals of the charge and discharge, especially when
taxes are being accounted for, therefore often inﬂates the ﬁgures.
All sources : NAS, unless otherwise stated.
T AX E S L E V I E D I N S COT L AND
June 1640: parliament ratiﬁes earlier orders for 10th penny; imposes a one-oﬀ
tax called the 20th penny.
July 1643: one-oﬀ forced loan of £800,000 Scots and a tax of £120,000 Scots.
Jan. 1644 : excise tax on a wide range of staple goods proposed; little collected
before 1647.
Feb. 1645: monthly maintenance, levied almost continuously until conquest of
1651 (with parliamentary approval).
Tenth and twentieth pennies
PA16/3/5/3, Army papers, accounts, etc., 1640–54, pp. 1–2.
Loan and tax
PA16/3/2/5, Warrants of parliamentary committees, etc., 1640–58.
PA7/6/158/1, Supplementary parliamentary papers, 1649.
PA15/7, Account of Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, Dec. 1645–Nov. 1646, p. 8.
Monthly maintenance (including sums imposed for the use of Charles II’s household )
E27/1, Receiver-general’s accounts, 1642–51, fos. 11v, 45v–46r.
PA7/5/29, Supplementary parliamentary papers, 1647–8.
PA15/7, Account of Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, Dec. 1645–Nov. 1646,
pp. 1, 35–7.
PA15/10, Accounts of Sir John Weems of Bogie, Jan.–Dec. 1648, pp. 21–3
[parts unpaginated].
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PA15/11/1, Account of Sir James Stewart, 1648–9, pp. 1, 66–70.
PA15/12, Account of Sir John Smith, Dec. 1650–1, 1658–9, pp. 2–3.
Remittances for quartering in local communities
PA15/8, Accounts of Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, Dec. 1645–Dec. 1646,
pp. 4–5.
PA15/11/1, Account of Sir James Stewart, 1648–9, pp. 66–70.
Excise tax
E78/1, Accounts of Sir James Stewart, 1644–8.
E78/2, Accounts of Sir John Wauchope of Niddrie and Sir John Smith of
Groathall, pp. 1–4, 10–12.
GD103/2/3/9, Compt of the excise made by Sir James Stewart of Kirkfeild,
Mar. 1648, pp. 4–6.
PA15/11/1, Account of Sir James Stewart, 1648–49, p. 1.
P A YMENT S TO THE S COTT I S H ARMY I N ENG LAND
BY THE ENG L I S H P AR L I AMENT
The ‘brotherly assistance ’
PA14/1, Register of the Committee for Common Burdens, etc., Nov. 1641–Jan.
1645, fos. 7v, 39r–v.
PA16/3/5/3, Army papers, Accounts, etc., 1640–1654.
Scottish forces occupying the north of England in 1640
PA16/3/5/3, Army papers, Accounts, etc., 1640–54.
Scottish forces active in England, 1644–6
PA15/5, Account of William Levengstoune, Apr. 1644–Mar. 1645, fos. 1r–v, 8r.
PA15/7a, Account of Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, Nov. 1644–Dec. 1645,
pp. 1–3.
PA15/8, Accounts of Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, Dec. 1645–Dec. 1646,
pp. 2–5, 124, 138, 162, 169.
PA15/9, Account of Sir James Stewart, 1646–8, fo. 3v.
Payments to secure the withdrawal of the Scottish army in 1647
Copies of the receipts can be found in: F. Peck, Desiderata Curiosa, or a collection of
divers scarce and curious pieces relating chieﬂy to English history (2 vols., London, 1779),
II, pp. 370–1.
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P A YMENT S TO THE SCOT S ARMY I N I R E L AND BY
THE S COTT I S H AND ENG L I S H P AR L I AMENT S
Correspondence of the Scots commissioners in London, 1644–1646, ed. H. W. Meikle
(Roxburghe Club, 1917), pp. 12, 15, 33, 55.
Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, 2nd series, ed. D. Masson (8 vols., Edinburgh,
1899–1908), VIII, pp. 83–92.
Calendar of State Papers (Domestic), 1645, p. 333.
PA15/7, Account of Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, Dec. 1645–Nov. 1646, pp. 21,
30, 37.
PA16/3/2/5, Warrants of parliamentary committees, etc., 1640–58.
National Archives, Kew, State Papers Domestic (Supplementary) SP46/106, fos.
90–126.
National Library of Scotland, Adv.Ms.33/4/8, Transactions of the Scots army in
Ireland from 1643 to June 1648 (a transcription by William S. Brockington,
Kirsty McAlister, and John R. Young will shortly be available, Four Courts
Press, Dublin, forthcoming).
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